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WEST FIRGINIA. LAW QUARTERLY
WAYS BY NECESSITY*
JAMES W. SIMONTON*"
Upon an unqualified grant by A to B of the center acre
of a forty acre tract, there will be certain limitations, termed
natural rights,' upon the use B may make of that acre, and
on the use A may make of the rest of his land. But A may
grant to B one or more of these limitations on the use oT B's
land. Thus he may grant to B the privilege to pollute
waters flowing 'past A's land, or to dig in his land as he may
please, regardless of whether subsidence of A's land may
follow; on the other hand A may grant to B the privilege
to drive across A's land or to lay and maintain a pipe across
it. Whereas the latter grants confer privileges upon B to
use A's lands, the former are in effect releases of natural
rights that limit B's use of his own land. As pointed out
by Markby2 and Terry,3 these easements, which in effect
release natural rights, are indistinguishable from natural
rights except as to origin, for easements can arise only by
grant or prescription.
In the case of the grant of one acre in a forty acre tract,
although there be no express grant to B of a right of way
over A's land, B will get a way by necessity.4 It has been
suggested that this is a natural right and not an easement.
It is settled that an easement by necessity will arise either
by grant or reservation, if, after a conveyance, the grantee
has no access except over the lands of the grantor, or where
the grantor has other lands to which he can have access
only over the land granted, provided there is nothing to
the contrary in the transaction.
Should the easement by necessity be treated as one of
the normal rights of ownership in land? If the fundamen-
tal difference between easements and natural rights lies
* This article originally appeared in 25 COLUMBIA LAv, REvIEw 571. Repripted by
permission of COLuMBiA LAW Itvrgw, Columbia University. New York City.
*. Professor of Law, West Virginia University, Morgantown, W. Va.
% For a good discussion of the nature of natural rights, see an article on Natural
Easement by Professor Bigelow in 9 ILL. LAW REv. 541 (1915).
' See MARKEY. ELEMENTS OF LAW §426 (5th ed. 1896).
' See TERRY, LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw §392 (1884).
This is so well- settled that it requires no citation of authorities. B will get the
way, if he has no access to a highway except through A's land.
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in the manner of origin, then we can say that as to origin
the easement by necessity differs from natural rights, for
it does not arise merely because a subdivision of land has
certain natural features, but only when there chances to
be lack of access to a public highway. A public highway
is an artificial feature. Every time a tract of land is subdi-
vided, natural rights arise from the natural situation and
configuration of the soil, but the easement by necessity de-
pends on the extrinsic fact whether or no there is an ac-
cessible highway. The easement by necessity has always
been treated by the courts as an easement and not as a
natural right. It is after all a right in the land of another.
Once created it becomes a legal incumbiance on the ser-
vient tenement. If it is a natural right, it differs in this
respect from other. natural rights. Seemingly the courts
have quite properly regarded easements by necessity as
true easements. It would only tend to confusion to consider
them as natural rights.
Historically, the easement by necessity has been treated
as a true easement. The maxim of law at the root of the
right is ancient. In the common law the doctrine can be
traced at least to the time of Edward I, for it was said,5
"Note that the law is that anyone who grants a thing to
someone is understood to grant that without which the
thing cannot be or exist." From this maxim and its ex-
tended applications seems to have developed the easement
by necessity. In 1379 we find a case which holds that if
there is a grant of a pond with the fish, the grantee may
enter to take the fish with nets and other devices, but he
may not cut a ditch and drain the pond for the purpose of
getting the fish unless he cannot take them otherwise. 6 In
1523, the Bishop of London brought trespass, alleging he
had leased land to the defendant, excepting the trees, and
the defendant (seemingly) had taken "swans and shovelers"
which nested in such trees, which was the trespass relied
upon.7 The court held the defendant liable and Judge
FrrzITZERERT, GRANTS, 41. This maxim is cited in Lord Darcy v. Askwith, Hobart
234 (1618), and referred to, arouendo, in Reniger v. Fogossa, 1 Plowd. 16a (1467). In
Liford's Case, 11 Coke Rep. 46b, 52a (1615), what seems to be the Latin version is given
as follows, "Lez est cuicumque aliquis quid concedit, concedere Widetur, et id sins quo
res ipsa ese non potuit, and this is a maxim of law."
0 See FrrzHERBERT, BARSR, 237, or Year Book, 2 R. 2.
Y. B. 14 Hen. VIII p. 1, f. 1 (1523). The action was quare clausum fregit and
the court had difficulty in determining whether the defendant had broken any close
of the plaintiff.
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Brook remarked, "and the underwood so excepted he can
cut and carry away at his pleasure, as if he except a mine
he can come to it." Judge Brundel said, "If the lessor
reserve a pond he shall have the fish * * * * If I lease a
manor reserving the warren, I shall have the coneys, though
the warren is only a liberty, and if one excepts it, he can
lawfully come and take them, for the law gives him a
means to arrive at the thing; as if I except a hall and stable,
I shall have free egress and regress to come to it, so here
the bishop can come and take them" (the swans and shov-
elers). Here is a dictum supporting an easement by nec-
essity to something excepted from a grant, and the judges
seemingly refer to the maxim and to the case given above.
In 1615 there was an actual decision, in a case similar to
the above." Land had been demised, excepting the trees,
and the plaintiff had entered. Later the defendant, by
authority of the owner of the reversion, entered to view the
trees and sold some of them, and for this he was sued in
trespass. The court held he was not liable, and said, "when
the lessor excepted the trees, and afterwards had an in-
tention to sell them, the law gave him, and them who would
buy, power, as incident to the exception, to enter and show
the trees to those who would have them; for without sight
none would buy, and without entry they could not see them."
The principle that a grant must be construed most
strongly against the grantor had already been unsuccess-
fully urged, for we find in Sheppard's Touchstone the fol-
lowing :9
"The exception is always taken most in favor of the
feoffee, lessee, etc., and against feoffor, lessor. And
yet, as a rule, what will pass by words of a grant, will
be excepted by the same words in an exception. And
it is another true rule, that when anything is excepted,
all things that depending on it, and necessary for ob-
taining it, are excepted also."
Thus early in the 17th century we find the easement by
necessity established in the case of a thing excepted from
a grant. At this time perhaps the principle had not yet
5 Liford's Case, supra, n. 5, p. 52a. There is a dictum to like effect in Nicholas v.
Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121 (1607).
SiUEPPARD's ToucHsToNE, p. 100. More or less complete statements of similar
import are to be found in other of the 17th century books. See FWOH's LAw 63;
dN's MAxIMs 16; PaKrMs, PROFzTALE BOOK §110. Finch cites the cases given In
note3 7 and 8.
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been extended to the different situation where the grantor
owns other lands not mentioned in the grant, to which he
has no access except over the lands conveyed. As to the
converse, where the way is necessary to the lands granted,
and is over lands of the grantor not mentioned in the grant
this would fall directly within the maxim above, and on
principle should not be treated differently from the excep-
tion cases.
In Clark v. Cogge,10 decided in 1607, there was a question
as to whether the grantee could have a way by necessity
over other lands of the grantor, and the court held he could
have such a way, "for otherwise he could not have any pro-
fit of his land." But the court also said, "If a man has four
closes lying together and sells three of them, reserving the
middle close, and hath not any way thereto but through
one of those which he sold, although he reserved not any
way, yet he shall have it, as reserved to him by law." Here
we find the principle extended by a confidently stated dic-
tum to the case where the way is claimed for the benefit
of land retained by the grantor, which presumably was not
mentioned in the grant. But in Packer v. Welsted," in 1658,
we get a square decision on the latter point. The way was
claimed Tor the benefit of land of the grantor not mentioned
in the conveyance and it was held the way should be
allowed. Chief Justice Glyn said, "But the jurors having
found it to be a way of necessity, it seems to me that the
way remains, for it is not only a private inconvenience, but
it is also to the prejudice of the public weal, that land should
lie fresh and unoccupied,'2 and so has been the opinion of
Lord Rolles, as I hear on the circuit at Winchester." This
decision has ever since represented the law. The case was
decided during the early part of the period of the influx
of equity and natural law,13 so we find that the rule is based
on public policy, which must mean, if anything, that the
general social interest favors the occupancy and utilization
of the land. Previous cases had merely stated that if a
;o Cro. Jac. 170 (1607). There is a similar dictum in Beaudely v. Brook, Cro. Jac.
189, 190 (1608).
It 2 Sid. 39, 111 (1658). A translation will be found in volume 3 of GRAY'S CASES
ON PROPERTY (2nd ed.) 347 (1906), and in WARREN'S CASES ON CONVEYANCING 472.
19 Italics the writer's.
1S See Roscoe Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines,"
27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 213-220 (1914). While this affected the law chiefly through
equity, yet the common law judges were not free from the influence of the spirit of the
times,
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way were not allowed, the owner could get no profit from
his land, and it seems clear that the judges of the 13th and
14th centuries would not have understood this notion of
public policy, for the idea of nationality had not yet suffi-
ciently developed. The situation presented in the above
case was treated just like the old case of a grant with some-
thing excepted from it. While' the court did not cite any
of the previous authorities, counsel in argument did.14 From
this time on the easement by necessity was well established,
and no distinction was made between the two types of
cases. Both types appear in the mining decisions discussed
in the latter part of this paper, in which cases the principles
of the easement by necessity have been extended to horizon-
tal states in the strata olf the soil' 5 In general, it may be
stated that the notion that the easement by necessity is
based on public policy has been accepted.10
Although the decisions up to this time had not settled
the manner in which the easement by necessity arose, since
many of the cases involved ways to things excepted from
grants, it was to be expected that the theory of implied
grant or reservation would eventually be adopted. The
definite establishment of this theory seems to have been
largely due to the note of Sergeant Williams to Pomfret v.
R'icroft.17  He argued that it was wrofig to plead the way by
necessity in general terms, as was not uncommonly done,",
without specifying the manner whereby the servient land
became charged with the burden, stating, "It derives its
origin from a grant. For there seems to be no difference
where a thing is granted by express words, and where by
operation of law it passes as incident to the grant. In the
latter case, it would be a superfluous and inoperative clause
in the deed to convey the incident by express words of
grant, being only expressio eorum quae tacite insunt." He
concluded that since the way by necessity arises by implied
34 Among those cited was the case in Y. B. 14 Hen. VIII, pl. 1 (1523), supra,
M. 7; Liford's Case, supra, n. 5, and Piggot v. Sury, Popham 166.
SFor example, a conveyance of the land, reserving the coal and other minerals,
or a conveyance of a vein of coal without mention of a right of access to the strata
beneath the coal. Both types are thus presented, though no distinction has been made.
*1 Some of the authorities are Dutton v. Taylor. 2 Lutw. 1487 (1598) : Plnnlngton v.
GaUand, 8 Exch. 1 (1853); Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71 (1881); Smith v. Griffin, 14
Colo. 429, 23 Pac. 905 (1890) ; Powers v. Heffernan. 233 II. 597, 84 N. E. 661 (1908) ;
Crotty v. Coal Company. 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233 (1913). This basis of the rule Is now
generally recognized.
,1 See Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Saund. 321, 323, n. 6 (1680).
la This was probably due to the idea that the way might be allowed wherever there
was a tract of landlocked land, for the reason of public policy would seem to Justify
such easement in all cases.
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grant it ought to be so pleaded. His argument that the
implied grant is the same as an express one in general terms,
seems to have been overlooked by the Master of Rolls in Corpo-
ration of London v. Riggs,19 when he held, citing the note, that
the scope of the easement was limited by the use to which
the dominant land was being put at the time of the grant.
This note seems to have been sufficient to cause Lord
Ellenborough to hold, in Bullard v. Harrison,20 that a general
way of necessity does not exist, but that unity of possession
must be properly pleaded and proved. This became the
settled law both in England and in this country.21 The
easement must arise by implication from a conveyance. It
logically follows that if the claimant cannot trace back to
a unity of ownership of the servient and dominant tene-
ments, he cannot establish an easement by necessity, for he
cannot show the required basis to raise the implication.
However, it is to be noted that the result of the doctrine
of the easement of necessity by implied reservation is that
though the grantee knew nothing of the dominant tenement
at the time of the grant, yet his land will be burdened with
an easement; and a covenant of warranty in his deed does
not protect him, nor does it prevent the implication of the
easement,22 This seems a violation of the rule that a
grantor should not derogate from his own grant, or the rule
that the language of the conveyance must be construed most
strongly against the grantor. It is evident that the ease-
ment by necessity is imposed by operation of law, regard-
less of the knowledge of the parties as to the circumstances,
and regardless of their actual intent, unless such intent be
expressed. The attempt to base the easement on the pre-
sumed intent of the parties was doubtless due to the mode
of juristic thinking of the period. During the 19th century
courts tried to simulate everything to property, and there
was a strong tendency to reduce everything in the nature of
a legal transaction to contract. The notion was that rights
arose because of the exercise of the wills of individuals,
and so the attempt was made to have the easement by neces-
;' L. R. 13 Ch. D. '98 (1879).
0 4 11. & S. 387 (1815).
24 Tracy v. Atherton, 35 Vt. 52 (1862) ; Brice v. Randall, 7 Gill & John Md. 349
(1835) ; see collection of other cases in TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed.) 1300 (1920).
22 Vandalia R. R. v. Furnas, 182 Ind. 306, 106 N. E. 401 (1914) ; Powers v. Heifer-
nan, supra, n. 16; Brigham v. Smith, 70 Mass. 297 (1855).
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sity appear to be due to an agreement of the parties.2 It
is not strange that judges concluded that the easement by
nece ssity arose because of the presumed intent of the par-
ties. They said, "Although it is called a way of necessity,
yet the necessity does not create the way, but merely fur-
nishes evidence as to the real intent of the parties. For the
law will not presume that was the intention of the parties,
that one should convey land to the other, in such a manner
that the grantee could derive no benefit from the conveyance;
nor that he should so convey a portion as to deprive himself
of the enjoyment of the remainder. The law, under such
circumstances, will give effect to the grant according to the
presumed intent of the parties.124  This explanation was
doubtless quite satisfactory to the mind of the jurist of the
middle of the last century. But statement of the court in
Buss v. Dyer,25 comes nearer the truth. It said, "The foun-
dation of this rule regarding ways of necessity is said to be a
fiction of law, by which a grant or reservation is implied,
to meet a special emergency, on grounds of public policy,
in order that no land may be left inaccessible for the pur-
pose of cultivation." Confusion has frequently resulted
where what is really a fiction is thus referred to as the in-
tent of the parties.26
Perhaps reference to the civil law will throw some light
on how the problem ought, to be regarded. Article 682 of
2Early in the 19th century the common law in England had reached a period
of maturity. "In this stage of matured legal system, the watchwords are equality and
security * * * * Accordingly as used here, equality includes two things: equality of
operation of legal rules, and equality of opportunity to exercise one's faculties and
employ one's substance. The idea of security is derived from the strict law but Is
modified by ideas of the stage of equity or natural law, especially the Idea of Insisting
upon will rather than form as a cause of legal results and the Idea of pyqventind the
enrichment of one at the expense of another through form and without will, In conse-
quence security, as used here, includes two things: the idea that everyone Is to be
secured in his interests against aggression by others, and the idea that others are to be
permitted to acquire from him or to extract from him only through his will that they
do so or through his breach of rules devised to secure others in like interests * * * e
"To insure security the maturity of the law Insists upon property and contract as
fundamental ideas." See Pound, op. cit., n. 13, pp. 220-221.
As is pointed out by Professor Bohlen, this tendency led the courts to refer all possible
obligations to the consent of the party on whom imposed. Thus we had assumption of
rink, the fellow servant rule and the like, all referred to some implied terms of contract.So it is not strange to find the easement by necessity based on Implied contract.
See Bohlen, "Voluntary Assumption of Risk," 20 HAav. L. Rgv. 14, 81-32 (1906).
2, Collins v. Prentice, 16 Conn. 89 & 423 (1842). See also, Nicholas v. Luce, 24
Pick. (Mass.) 102 (1834); Carmen v. Dick, 170 N. C. 806, 87 S. E. 224 (1915).
2 125 Mass. 287, 291 (1878), quoted with approval in Howley v. Chafes, 88 Vt. 468,
93 Atl. 120 (1914).
- See Corporation of London v. Riggs, supra, n. 19. Good examples of this
may be found in prescription cases in those jurisdictions which hold the presumption
of the lost grant Is rebuttable. Reid v. Garnett, 101 Va. 47, 43 S. E. 182 (1903), i an
extreme example.
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the French Civil Code27 provides that any landowner who
has no right of access may compel his neighbor to give him
access to the highway, except that under Article 684 he
must claim the way, if possible, over land which has been
divided as a result of a legal transaction. But if one con-
tracts to sell land to another, and it is so located that access
cannot be had except over other land of the vendor, then
good faith requires that he furnish a way gratuitously. As
we have seen, the common law reaches the latter result by
the application of the principle that when one grants a
thing, he grants the means reasonably to enjoy it. Prob-
ably everyone will agree that the law ought to go this far;
a real and not a fictional intent may reasonably be implied
in such a case. But under the French law, since good faith
does not require the vendee to allow the vendor a gratuitous
right of way over the lands conveyed for the benefit of
other land of the vendor,28 Article 682 would, seemingly,
permit the vendor to have a way only on payment of the
damages caused thereby. It will be noted that under the
French law any owner who has no right of access may have
a way opened, on paying the actual damages; while at com-
mon law, if a way of necessity does not exist, a way can be
had only by purchase at the price demanded. The French
law provides the better solution.
Curiously enough the German Civil Code of 1900 seems
to have a provision which makes the German law very simi-
lar to the common law. Article 917 provides that a land-
locked owner who has no right of access to a highway, may
compel adjoining owners to allow him a way on payment of
a reasonable rental. Article 918 provides that, if as a result
of a conveyance, "the part alienated or the part retained is
cut off from the connection with the public road, the owner
of the part over which the connection formerly existed must
permit a way of necessity. The alienation of one of several
27 FRENCH CIVIL CODE (Wright's Translation) : Article 682-"The owner of a prop-
erty which is entirely surrounded by other properties and which has no exit to the
public road, or only an insufficient exit for working it for agricultural or industrial
purposes, has a right to claim a right of way over his neighbor's property on paying
coirpensation for any damage he may thereby cause."
Article 684---"I the inaccessibility of the land is the result of the property having
been divided by sale, exchange, a partition, or any contract, a right of way can only be
asked for over the properties affected by such contracts. Neveitheless where a suffi-
cient right of way cannot be given over the properties so divided, Art. 682 shall apply."
See also, MERRcx's LA. CODE, Arts. 699-702, for similar provisions.
2 An application of the principle of the Roman Law that each party to a legal
transaction do what good faith requires. See 1 CoLLms & CAprrAxT, Daor2 CIVIL
Fwwmrs 758.
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pieces of land belonging to the same owner is equivalent to
the alienation of a part of the land. '29 In such an instance,
there is no need to pay compensation. 0 The German law,
then, is like ours as to easements by necessity, permitting,
in addition, the owner of landlocked land, not falling with-
in the provisions of Article 918, to have a way on payment
of a rental. Instead of enacting the Roman law, the Ger-
man Code retained a bit of the old Germanic land law."'
All of the above systems agree that a gratuitous way must
be allowed by the grantor if the land granted has no access
to. the highway. Both the German law and the common
law permit an easement by implied reservation for the bene-
fit of other land of the grantor. At common law, the courts
have no means of compelling the sale or lease of the ease-
ment as is provided in the civil law codes. There is some
justification for implying an easement across the land con-
veyed by the grantor, for otherwise the grantee and other
adjoining owners may be able to compel the grantor to sell
at whatever price is offered. Common law judges allowed
the easement, assigning as a reason that it is contrary to the
public weal that land should not be utilized. The social
interest certainly demands that the owner have access to the
land, for otherwise it will lie fallow. Such a consideration
applies equally to any tract of landlocked land, but there is
an excellent reason why courts have limited the doctrine.
How is the court to determine where the easment is to be
located, and on whom the burden is to fall? If compensa-
tion could be required, then the problem might have been
solved in the same manner as in the civil law. But our
courts cannot be expected to provide for a system of com-
pensation by judicial legislation. This inability, no doubt,
explains the present limits of the doctrine. Nevertheless,
in spite of this limitation, the courts have been able to find
an easement by necessity in almost all of the cases that have
arisen. In the case of Crotty v. Coal Company,82 for example,
2 Wang's Translation.
Z See SCHUSTER, PRINCIPLES OF THE GERMAN LAW 889.
'% For the history of this, see KAIDINa, ARaciv FUR DIE CIVILISTICHE PrAXIS 407,
et. seq.
2 Supra, n. 16. It appeared in this case that about 1832 land was conveyed
in two tracts, one of 150 acres to Bowker, and the other of .497 acres to Blake. At the
time, the 150 acre tract had 80 acres lying below, and separated from the rest by a
cliff 100 feet high. There was a road to the 120 acres lying up the mountain side
but the 30 acres could not be reached from this because of the cliff. Long after 1882 a
new road was opened through the 497 acres, hut it did not touch the 80 acres. The
latter had been divided among the Woods' heirs, except 4.5 acres, which had been
purchased by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had erected a residence and store building and
9
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the court went back from 1905 to a conveyance made in
1832 in order to find the necessary unity of ownership, and
then implied an easement by necessity to a public road
which was not opened till long after 1832. The fact seems
to be that the courts use the implied grant or reservation as
a means of determining the land on which the burden shall
fall. When the servient land can not be determined'in this
manner, no easement is allowed.
The manner in which certain questions have been handled
by the courts will now be examined. While considerations
of public policy lie behind the doctrine, the notion that the
easement by necessity arises because of the intent of the
parties has frequently had great influence on the result
reached, and, as a consequence, this result has not always
been in accord with the underlying public policy. An ex-
ample already referred to is the tendency to treat evidence
of the necessity, as evidence bearing on te intent of the
parties. Others will appear later.
It is said that an easement by necessity cannot be implied
in favor of a grantee from the state or from the govern-
ment, over other lands of such state or government. It is
difficult to see why such a notion should ever have risen
unless behind it is some remnant of the prerogative of the
sovereign, though this, it seems, is not suggested in the deci-
sions. Aside from dicta there is only one unsatisfactory case
where a grant by a state is involved.83 In that case, the
court did give as one ground for its decision, that the way
cannot be implied over state lands. It argued that if an
easement by necessity once arose it would continue for-
ever, and that the whole state might eventually be covered
with a network of such ways if such easements were al-
lowed. Howeve, since there appeared other good grounds
for the result reached,3 4 this case is but weak authority.
was using a way to the new road when the defendant, who owned the 497 acres, stopped
him and a suit was started. No way could here be implied except by going back
to the conveyance of 1832. This the court held might be done, though the way was
implied to a road not in existence at the time of the conveyance.
33 Pearne v. Coal Creek M. & M. Co., 90 Tenn. 619 (1891). Texts usually so state
the law and cite this one case as authority. See JONES, EASEMhENTS §301 (1898). But
the court in the above case expresses its ground for decision thus: "It would he ruinous
to establish the precedent contended for, since by it every grantee from the earliest
history of the state, and those who would succeed to his title would have an implied
right of way over all the surrounding and adjacent lands held under junior grants, even
to the utmost limits of the state." The language is foolish.
" The plaintiff claimed a way to coal under his land (where the coal was about
60D feet down) through a coal mine opened and worked on adjoining lands from which
tunnels had been driven almost to plaintiff's boundary. The doctrine as to easements
by necessity does not apply to such a case.
10
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In two cases it has been said that the doctrine does not
apply to lands granted by the federal government, but in
neither case did it appear that there was any necessity at
the time the grants were made. In both cases it is appar-
ent that the desire of the claimant was to get the benefit
of a private road constructed by the defendant at consider-
able expense, without paying for the privilege, instead of
constructing .a private road of his own. 5 But in two other
cases the question was squarely raised, and in both it was
held that the doctrine is applicable to the public lands of the
government.3 6  This seems sound. There is no good reason
why the doctrine should not apply to state and federal
lands.
What degree of necessity must be shown to establish the
easement? It has been frequently asserted that there must
be a strict necessity and that a reasonable necessity or con-
venience is not sufficient. 7 The term "reasonable necessity"
is generally used in casds where the party has another way
which is less convenient.than the one claimed because long-
er, more hilly or over water; for where there is another
way, but so limited as to be inadequate to permit the full
enjoyment of the land, the easement by necessity has been
allowed.38 This strict necessity notion is probably a product
of 19th century juristic thinking. If the necessity is evi-
dence of* the parties' intent, then it is reasonable that no
intent should be implied, particularly against a grantee, un-
less the grantor has no other means of access to his land.
But as soon as it is sought to consider the matter from the
social interest viewpoint, the easement ought to be allowed
15 United States v. Rindge, 208 Fed. 611 (D. C. Cal. 191) : Bully Hill Min. Co. v.
Bruson, 4 Cal. App. 180, 87 Pac. 237 (1906). In neither of these cases did it appear
that the necessity existed at the time of the grant. In both it did appear that tho
defendant had made a private road, the use of which the plaintiff wished to secure freo
of charge.
" Herrin v. Sieben, 46 Mont. 226. 127 Pac. 823 (1912) ; Snyder V. Warford, 11 Mo.
513 (1848). The Missouri case seemingly involved an implied grant, while the Montana
case involved an implied reservation. In the latter the government had granted
alternate sections of land to a railroad which had granted several sections to the plaintiff.
At this time the public bad the right to pasture government land. Had there been no
vay implied in favor of the government, the plaintiff could have excluded all others
from the government sections enclosed by his sections. See a similar attempt to get full
use of the alternate government sections in Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 618,
17 Sup. Ct. 864 (1896).
"' Dee v. King, 73 Vt. 875, 50 AtI. 1109 (1901): United States v. Rindge, supra,
n. 35; Hildreth v. Googins, 91 M6. 227, 39 AtI. 550 (1898). Many cases can be
found which say that strict necessity must be shown, but where a way is really needed
the courts always seem to allow it. See the statement of the law in TIFFANY, Op. cit.,
n. 21, 1306-8, which is very cautious, and also the note in 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1019 (1909).
- Myers v. Dunn, supra, n. 16; Camp v. Whitman, .61 N. J. Eq. 467, 26 Ati.
917 (1893) ; Feeffees in Ipswich v. Proprietors, 174 Mass. 572, 65 N. E. 462 (1809). See
also notes in 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1019 (1909) ; 82 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1076 (1911).
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whenever it is necessary to enable the owner to have the
full enjoyment of the land; it is not essential, if he has an
adequate though less convenient means of access; it is essen-
tial, where he has a means of access too limited to enable
him to enjoy his land fully. A considerable number of
cases have accomplished this result in effect by saying that
strict necessity is not essential but that a high degree of
necessity will be sufficient.
3 9
Closely connected with the problem of the degree of
necessity required, is the question of the scope or extent of
an easement by necessity. Is there a general easement for
all purposes, or is the extent of the easement limited by the
condition and use of the dominant tenement at the time of
the conveyance from which the easement is implied? If
the easement is based on social considerations, then it ought
to be adequate in scope to enable the dominant owner to
have the reasonable enjoyment of his land for all lawful
purposes as long as the necessity continues. A way to
woodland would be almost valueless after the timber is
cleared, and a way for agricultural purposes would not per-
mit mining if minerals were discovered. A social interest
that favors a way for agricultural purposes must equally
sanction a way for mining and manufacturing purposes.
Striking cases have arisen where a particular vein of coal
was conveyed in fee, and many years later oil and gas were
discovered in the land.40 The social interest is evident in
such cases. So far we have considered only the question
whether an easement by necessity may be raised-that is,
whether in a particular case the easement exists or does
not exist. In determining the scope of the easement, we
assume the right to the easement has been established.
Nowhere does the confusion arising from the above men-
tioned fiction of presumed intent appear more plainly than
here, most courts apparently observing no difference be-
tween the two questions, assuming, as a result, that the
"strict necessity" or "high degree of necessity" test applies
to the second question as well as to the first. If the domi-
_' Trump v. McDonnell. 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353 (1897) ; Smith v. Griffin, supra,
n. 16; Grainea v. Lungsford, 120 Ga., 370, 47 S. E. 967 (1904); Schmidt v. Quinn.
136 Mass. 575 (1883) ; Pettingill v. Porter, 90 Mass. 1 (1864) ; Weise v. Thein, 279
Mo. 524, 214 S. W. 853 (1919); Crotty a. Coal Company, supra, n. 16; Uhl v. Ohio
River R. R., 47 W. Va. 59, 34 S. E. 934 (1899) ; Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219
(1880) ; Galloway v. Bonesteel, 65 Wis. 79, 26 N. W. 262 (1886).
"0 See cases cited infra, footnotes 74, 75, 78, 87, 90, and 91.
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nant owner is entitled to an easement permitting the full
enjoyment of his land, then, it is plain, he is entitled to a
general easement with all reasonable incidents. In consid-
ering whether a particular thing is a proper incident to the
easement, the standard of reasonable convenience ought to
be applied. The distinction was well expressed by one
court in an opinion in a case involving incidents to the right
of access to minerals as follows :41
"There are obvious degrees of necessity for the use of
the surface in the conduct of subterranean mining opera-
tions, from the absolute necessity of sinking shafts or
making other entrances to the minerals, to the practical
necessities of business operations, such as the placing of
steam engines and machinery at the mouth of the en-
trances, of constructing ponds of water to supply the
engines, of laying and operating rail or tram ways to
bring in supplies and to carry out the ore, of storage of
minerals on the surface pending sales, of assembling
houses, stores, and shops for the use of the miners
It may again be noted that Serjeant Williams considered
that the way by necessity passes by operation of law, render-
ing superfluous a way expressly reserved. He understood
that the scope of the implied easement and of the easement
expressly granted in general language, was just the same.
But though the English court cited his note in Corporation of
London v. Riggs,42 it held that since the easement arises by
implied grant, it must be because of the lpresumed intent of
the parties, and they should be taken to have intended a
way to the dominant tenement merely for the purposes to
which it was being put at the time of the conveyance.
Jessel, Master of the Rolls, said :3
"The object of implying the regrant,44 as is stated by
the older judges, was that if you did not give the owner
of the reserved close some right of way or other, he could
neither use nor occupy the reserved close, nor derive any
benefit from it. But what is the extent of the benefit he
is to have? Is he entitled to say, I have reserved to my-
self more than that which enables me to enjoy it as it is at
See Himrod v. Ft. Pitt Min. & Mill Co., 220 Fed. 80, 83 (C. C. A. 8th Circ.
1915).
42 Supra, n. 19.
43 P. 807.
The English theory of re-grant is technical, and this so-called re-grant Is treated
.1 if it were a reservation.
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the time of the grant? And if this is the true rule, that he
is not to have more than necessity requires, as distinguished
from what convenience may require,45 it appears to me that
the right of way must be limited to that which is neces-
sary at the time of the grant; That is, he is supposed to
make a regrant to himself of such a right of way as will
enable him to enjoy the reserved thing as it is."
This is supposed to be the law of England,46 but it has
met with little favor in this country, and quite properly so.
It will be noted that the Master of the Rolls was considering
the second question stated above, and that he assumes that
strict necessity must be shown, though he cites no authority
to that effect.47 Furthermore, he treats the fictional intent
as if it were real. But even so, his argument is answered
by the following extract from a New Hampshire decision :48
"* * * * If the parties supposed a way passed as a
necessary incident of the grant, how can it be inferred
that they intended only a way for a particular purpose,
when they knew the land was capable of being used for
many purposes? * * * * The necessity is originally co-
extensive with all lawful uses of which the rear lot is
capable, and is not created by the appropriation of the
land to those uses."
In the Riggs Case the plaintiff had notice of the situation
of the dominant tenement, and it must have been clear that
the dominant land would be most useful for purposes other
than agricultural. The plaintiff was certainly not deceived.
It would be impossible to apply the doctrine of the Riggs Case
to land which had never been used for any purpose prior to
the time of the grant. Nor can it well be applied where
a vein of coal is conveyed in fee simple, and oil and gas are
later discovered in the land. The doctrine applied to the
latter case would seem to limit the right to drill through
the coal to drilling for known liquid minerals such as water.
But if we resort again to the social interest basis of the doc-
trine, we come to the same conclusion the New Hampshire
court reached on the theory of the presumed intent of the
13Italics ours.
,8 There seems to be no other English decision.
'7 Authorities cited seem to deal with the first question only.
43 Whittier v. Winldey, 62 N. H. 138, 341 (1882). This case and Myers v. Dunn,
suvza, n. 16, refused to gollow the doctrine of the Riggs Case for reasons stated
in the excerpt. Both courts assumed that the easement arose because of the presumed
intent of the parties.
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parties.49 The way ought to be one which will permit full en-
joyment, and not one which may prevent enjoyment of the
land for the purposes for which it is best suited. If we
count the mining cases discussed in the latter part of this
paper, there is now a formidable body of authority in this
country opposed to the Riggs Case, and seemingly but one
case in accord.5 0 It may therefore be stated that in this
country, the scope of the easement by necessity must be
such as to enable the dominant owner to enjoy his land for
all lawful purposes, so long as the necessity continues.
Is the so-called presumption of intent conclusive, or may
it be overcome by showing the real intent of the parties?
To put it in terms of public policy, are the interests in favor
of allowing the easement strong enough to overcome the
contrary expressed intent of the parties? Some presump-
tions in our law are so strong that they have become conclu-
sive, as, for example, the presumption of a lost grant from
adverse user for the requisite period. But it seems the pre-
sumption as to an easement by necessity may be overcome
by showing the actual contrary intent of the parties. Seem-
ingly the law allows a landowner to cut off all his rights of
access to his land, if he so desires.5' He may do this by
releasing all rights to others. And no easement by neces-
sity arises in favor of a grantee, where, by the language in
the deed, he represented himself as owning adjoining land
over which there was access to a highway, though this
recital was false.52 The same is held where the deed ex-
pressly creates a way which is too limited in scope for the
full enjoyment of the land.53 It would seem from the
authorities, that any language in the deed which fairly indi-
cates the intent not to have an easement by necessity, will
" In the mining eases, which deal with this second question, most of the courts
have also failed to observe that the question is different from the question whether or
not a way by necessity exists. Nevertheless they have always managed to reach about
the same result that they would have reached had they applied the reasonabld necessity
te3t.
W5 See cases cited infra, footnotes 74 to 88. See also, Myers v. Dunn, supra, n. 10;
Erie R. R. v. Realty Co., 92 Oh. St. 96, 110 N. E. 527 (1915) : Pearne v. Coal Creek
M. & M. Co., supra, n. 31;; Crotty v. Coal Company, supra, n. 16; Uhl v. Railroad Com-
pany, supra, n. 39. Highee Fishing Club v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 484,
79 Atl 826 (1911), seems to be the only case in this country which has followed the
Riggs Case.
5 There is no reason in law or ethics why parties may not convey land without
direct means of access if they desire to do so." Orpiu v. Morrison, 280 Mass. 529, 120
N. E. 183 (1918).
12 Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351, 78 At]. 456 (1910).
5 Haskell v. Wright, 23 N. J. Eq. 389 (1878).
15
Simonton: Ways by Necessity
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1926
WJYS BY NECESSITY
prevent its creation, 4 though it is settled that the mere fact
there are covenants of warranty in the deed will not have
this effect.65 It is probable that the courts from the first
would have denied an easement by necessity in any case
where the intent of the parties was expressed to the con-
trary. The added contractual interest of the parties, or
their expressed intent is sufficient to prevail against the so-
cial interest, added to the other interests, involved in the
case.
Suppose the grantor, on conveying the land, orally repre-
sents that he does not desire a way across the land granted;
or suppose there is a parol agreement that there shall be
no easement across the land granted. May this parol evi-
dence be introduced to negative the easement by necessity
where otherwise, under the circumstances, such an ease-
ment would be implied? It would seem that if the parties
may prevent the creation of the easement by necessity by
intent expressly indicated in the conveyance, then a like
intent otherwise indicated ought to be equally efficacious,
and this evidence ought to be admitted unless it falls within
the parol evidence rule. Such parol evidence has been
held admissible by what little authority there is.5 6 It has
been stated that since the easement must be shown by resort
to extrinsic evidence, such an "inference shown by parol
proof may be rebutted by parol proof showing what was
the actual agreement of the parties. ' 57  This court, ob-
viously, considered the easement as the result of a presumed
intent which could be negatived by the evidence. But the
author of an interesting note in the Yale Law Journal58
takes a contrary view, insisting that such evidence should
be inadmissible. His argument seems to be based on the
assumption that the presumption of the way by necessity is
based on the real intent of the parties, and that there is an
ad Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128 (1848) ; Powers v, Heffernan, supra, n. 16,
p. 597; Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Todd. 124 La. 543, 50 So. 526 (1909) ; Myers v. Dunn,
supra, n. 16, p. 71; Bascbm v. Cannon, 158 Pa. St. 225, 27 AtM 968 (1893); Uhl v.
Railroad Company, supra, n. 39.
rz Powers v. Heffernan, supra, n. 16; Vandalia M.R. v. Furnas, upra, n. 22;
Brigham v. Smith, supra, n. 22. These decisions are sound for warranty deeds are
made without thought as to such a thing as an easement by necessity. The covenant
Is inserted in the deed as a matter of course and does not indicate an intent that there
shall not he the usual implications of law.
"I Ewert v. Burtis, 12 AtI. 893 (N. J. Eq. 1888) ; Lebus v. Boston, 107 Ky. 98, 51
S. W,. 609 (1899) ; Golden v. Rupard, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2125, 80 S. W. 162 (1904). In
Orpin v. Morrison, supra, n. 51, the parole evidence had been admitted at the
trial without objection, so the court refused to pass on its admissibility.
'¢ Golden v. Rupard, supra, n. 56.
29 YALE L. J. 665 (1920).
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actual inference of intent from the circumstances, instead of
a fiction imposed on the parties by law.
It is submitted that to admit such parol evidence does not
violate the parol evidence rule. If the fiction is founded on
the social interest heretofore mentioned, then the question
is whether such social interest is strong enough to prevail
over the real intent of the parties expressed by way of oral
agreement. No reason is perceived why the intent of the
parties so expressed should not have the same effect as if
the language had been inserted in the conveyance.
As a result of the rule that the easement by necessity
must arise by implication from a conveyance by a common
owner of the two tenements, we have cases holding that
mere necessity alone is not sufficient to give rise to such an
easement. Most of these are cases in which, as a matter of
pleading, the claimant had not alleged the proper convey-
ance by a common owner.59 Where the question arose in a
case in which it appeared that both parties had derived title
through escheat, 80 or where the claimant had acquired
title to the dominant tenement under the Statute oT Limita-
tions,61 the claimant was held not entitled to an easement
by necessity. The easement is allowed only where title to
both tenements is derived from a common owner. 2 Where
the title has been so derived, the courts have been liberal in
allowing the easement. An easement by necessity has been
held to arise on severance of ownership by voluntary con-
veyance, 3 by partition," by sale under legal proceedings. 5
The easement may also arise on severance by way of devise
or by lease. In short the courts have allowed the easement
in all cases of severance of ownership, unless it be on sever-
ance by reason of eminent domain proceedings. 0 Hence
the courts have adopted the notion of implication from a
severance of ownership merely as a means of determining
the servient tenement, though the public policy upon which
r4 See Bullard v. Harrison, supra, n. 20; Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331 (1874)
Tracy v. Atherton, supra, n. 21.
10 Proctor v. Hodgson, 10 Exch. *824 (1855).
01 Wilkes v. Greenway, 6 T. L. R. 449 (1890).
For convenience the term common owner is here used to cover all cases.
"This is the usual type of case.
" lum v. Weston, 102 Cal. 362, 36 Pac. 778 (1894) ; Goodall v. Godfrey, supra,n. 89.
e, See TIFFANY, op. cit., n. 21, p. 1305.
aEminent domain cases are not in accord with each other. Much depends on the
construction of the particular statute. See Banks v. School Directors, 194 Ill. 247, 62 N.
E. 604 (1902) ; and Prowattain v. The City of Philadelphia, 17 Phila. (Pa.) 158 (1885),
which deny the way; Cleveland Ry. v. Smith, 177 Ind. 624, 97 N. E. 164 (1911), allows
it.
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the doctrine is based would justify an extension to all tracts
of landlocked land. It is arguable whether the courts have
not gone too far; yet the doctrine has been strongly upheld
from early times by the common law. The same result
was reached independently by the Germanic law, and was
evidently so well intrenched that in drafting the recent
Code it was deemed best not to disturb it. Certainly it is
clear that it would be inequitable to go further without
some means of compensating the servient owner, and it
would certainly require an unusual stretch of judicial au-
thority to create such an eminent domain procedure by deci-
sion.
In the above discussion, most of the decisions relied upon
have been those involving implied reservations, for cases
dealing with implied grants can usually be worked out on
other grounds. In the reservation cases there are certain
conflicting interests which must be considered by the courts;
a social interest in the security of transactions, to insure
grantee getting what he bargained for, viz., an unincumbered
property; on the other side, a social interest in the security
of acquisitions; a social interest that all land be capable of
being utilized by its owners; and, probably, a social interest
in preventing a situation where either the grantee or some
other adjoining owner may get an unmerited advantage
from the grantor's hard position. Public policy has been
used to cover the latter types of social interests, and has
been sufficient to turn the scales in favor of the grantor, and
might have prevailed in every case but for the difficulty
mentioned above in carrying the doctrine further by judi-
cial legislation. Where there is an express waiver by the
grantor, this added social interest in the security of trans-
actions has proved sufficient to defeat the easement.
In the portion of the paper to follow, certain types of
cases where there has been a severance of estates horizon-
tally, are discussed. These cases involve the principles of
easements by necessity, though they have usually not been
classed with the other decisions on the subject. This may
be due partly to the fact that they involve novel situations,
and partly to the fact that some of the courts have insisted
that the principles of easements by necessity do not apply,
without making clear what other principles do. However,
there seems no doubt that these cases do involve easements
18
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by necessity, and that they are among the most important
decisions on the subject. In these cases the social consider-
ations make a much stronger appeal than in the surface
cases.
During the last generation or two the mining industry
has experienced a development and assumed an importance
which could hardly have been anticipated during the first
half of the century. The most important minerals, coal,
iron, oil and gas are found in horizontal strata and to them
the western lode mining law has no application. The great
activity in a field where previous development had been of
relatively minor importance, made necessary the extension
of old rules of law and the selection and application of other
analogous rules and principles to new situations as they
arose. In this the commoh law exhibited a gratifying elas-
ticity, even within the seemingly rigid and settled field of
real-property law. As a result, an important body of law
is being rapidly developed in many portions of this field,
one part of which has interest to us here, namely, that
which deals with easements of access to mineral strata after
the ownership of such strata has been severed from that of
the rest of'the land. Where there has been a grant or a
reservation, which has severed the ownership of one or
more mineral strata in a tract of land, it sometimes happens
that no easement of access is mentioned, in which case if
such easement exists it must arise by implication; or it
sometimes happens that a right of access may be granted
or reserved by express language, without details as to the
extent of the right to be enjoyed,-in which case there
must be resort to implication, if the owner of the minerals
is to have an easement of access which is adequate to enable
him to have reasonable enjoyment of the minerals. As a
practical matter, not merely a right of access, but a right
of access of adequate scope, is vital to the owner of the
minerals, particularly in the case of such important and
widely distributed minerals as oil, gas and coal. Coal can-
not- be profitably mined unless such -modern methods can
be used as will enable the operator to compete successfully
with his numerous rivals. To deny him this is to deny him
the enjoyment of the mineral. Today this usually means
that he must have various buildings on the land, a tipple
with a railroad switch leading to it, and a lot of safety de-
19
Simonton: Ways by Necessity
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1926
WAYS BY NECESSITY
vices, many of which are required by statute, all of which
are burdensome to the land. In the future the number and
variety of essential buildings, machines and safety devices
are likely to increase rather than decrease. As to oil and
gas, unless there is an adequate means of access, the owner
may lose a considerable portion of his mineral by drainage
through adjoining lands. It may be pointed out that there
is a social interest in the mining of essential minerals, which
tends more and more to influence the courts. It is to the
public interest that these minerals be conserved, hence it
is important that they be mined and handled by methods
which are economical. There is also further consideration
that lower prices can be had by means of increased effici-
ency in mining.
Suppose A owns land in fee and grants to B a specific vein of
coal underneath the surface which underlies the whole tract,
without any mention of a right of access. It is evident B
should be given a right of access, or his coal may be valueless
to him. We can easily deal with this case on the principle
that A must be taken to have granted whatever is essential
to enable B to enjoy in a reasonable manner the estate granted.
Mining is the usual and customary mode of enjoying such an
estate. But oil, or another vein of coal may lie underneath
B's vein. It is evident A ought to have a right of access to
any valuable minerals which may lie underneath B's coal, for
otherwise he may not enjoy them unless he can purchase a
right of access through B's coal. Furthermore A may not
be able to get a water supply for use on the surface unless a
well can be sunk through such coal. The right of access if
given to B will be by implied grant, but if given to A, will be
by implied reservation. A has here granted to B an estate B
cannot reach except by passing through A's land, and A still
owns land underneath, which he cannot reach except by pass-
ing through B's coal. Here is the precise situation which,
when it occurs on the surface, gives rise to the easement by
necessity. Both A and B now have estates which may be
more completely landlocked than would be possible on the
surface where there is some possibility of access through the
air. It has been noted above that the connecting chain of
title may be broken, so that no easement can be implied, by
the acquisition of title to one of the estates by adverse pos-
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session. 67 But as to mineral strata this is less likely to
occur than on the surface. No one can acquire title to
B's coal merely by holding A's land adversely to A for the
statutory period. 68 It is almost impossible for anyone, after
the severance, to acquire title to B's coal by adverse holding.09
But it is at least arguable that if someone acquires title to
the surface by adverse possession, B may deny him access to
the strata underneath the coal on the ground that the new
owner does hold under or through A. But this liability to
have the easement of access cut off has not caused serious
difficulty on the surface, and would be much less likely to
cause difficulty as to these mineral strata.70 It is submitted
that in adjusting the numerous problems that arise in con-
nection with easements of access, the whole matter can be
worked out satisfactorily on the principles of easements by
necessity. There is no other category known to the com-
mon law which fits the situation with any degree of accur-
acy. Since the common law has as far as possible simu-
lated underground estates to estates on the surface, there
seems no reason for making an exception here. Either we
must resort to the principles of easements by necessity or
we must create some new category.
7 1
When there has been a severance of mineral strata, with
no right of access expressly mentioned, either to that sev-
ered, or to the strata below, or where there is a right of
access granted or reserved in general language, two ques-
tions arise which are similar to those which have arisen as
to surface easements by necessity. First, there is the prob-
lem whether an easement of access can be implied at all,
where no such right is expressly mentioned, that is, whether
there is present the requisite high degree of necessity, or,
as some courts say, the requisite strict necessity. Second,
assuming an easement by necessity will be implied under
the circumstances and that its location is determined, what
See Wilkes v. Greenway, supra, n. 61, which seems to be the only case.
See 2 C. J. 71; 6 Ann. Cas. 140, 142 (1907), where cases are cited. A leading case
is Wallace a. Elm Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S. E. 485 (1905).
e' See 6 Ann. Cas. 141, note (1905) ; Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1199, note. The authorities
cited contain little more than dicta, though it !A stated as law, that one holding the our-
face adversely may acquire adverse possession of the minerals by opening mines.
70 This defect in the law is of little moment since cases practically never arse whero
no easement can be allowed.
71 When text writers have mentioned the matter at all, they have classed such
rights as easements by necessity. MACSWEENEY, THE LAw OF MINES (5th ed.) 294
(1922) ; LINDLEY, MINES (3rd ed.) §813 (1914) ; JONES, op. cit., n. 33 §813, GoDDARD,
EASEMENTS (6th ed.) 37 (1914) ; REEVES, REAL PROPERTY 284 (1909) ; TIFFANY, op. cit.,
n. 21, p. 1296.
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is its scope or extent? Is there an easement such as would be
reasonably adequate as of the time and place of the convey-
ance, or is there an easement adequate for all purposes for
which the dominant estate may lawfully be used? This
second question is like the one discussed previously in con-
nection with Corporation of London v. Riggs. In case of
underground minerals, the only way of enjoying the domi-
nant estate is by mining, and when the minerals are ex-
hausted, peculiarly enough, the fee simple estate in the
mineral stratum is held to terminate.72 In practice the
second situation always involves the question whether the
dominant owner is entitled to mine by reasonable modern
methods, or whether he is restricted to the methods in vogue
at the time and place of the severance of ownership.
The second question arises in the same form, both in
the case of the easement by necessity and in the case where
there is a right of access expressly granted or reserved in
general language, for in the latter case the grant or reser-
vation confers only what would be implied were it omitted.
In either case the right of access is treated as if it were
expressly granted. If the doctrine of the Riggs Case were
applied, a different rule would prevail in cases involving
easements by necessity, and presumably the dominant own-
er would be restricted to methods of mining in vogue at the
time of the conveyance. This would'mean that the ease-
ments of access in such cases would frequently prove value-
less. The results of such a doctrine would be particularly
absurd here. The desirability of its application has, appar-
ently, never been seriously considered in these cases.
As will appear below, a considerable number of cases
have arisen involving rights of access to mineral strata.
While the courts have agreed that where no right of access
72 Courts held that horizontal strata might be granted in fee simple. Then they
assumed that this fee simple was just like a fee simple estate in land generally, and
hence when a vein of coal was granted to B and his heirs, that B got a fee simple
title to the space that contained the coal with all that such space contained. It is
clear in such case the parties intended to convey the coal and not space with its
contents. The grantee was intended to have full title to the coal with the right to
remove it whenever he chose to do so, but when the merchantable coal was once
exhausted, then his estate would be terminated for the subject matter would be gone.
Instead of this simple solution, the courts strongly affirmed the rule that the grantee got
an absolute fee in both the coal and the space that contained it. As a result cases have
arisen in some states in which courts have been compelled to recognize that the parties
could not possibly have intended the absolute conveyance of the space, so such courts
have held that the estate of the grantee terminates on exhaustion of the merchantable
coal. This has the effect of creating of new type of terminable fee simple--one in
which the termination is implied, and one in which the possibility of reverter passes with
the land on the alienation of the same. For a discussion of the matter with citation
of the authorities see an article in 27 W. VA. L. QuAR. 332 (1921).
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is expressly granted or reserved, a right of access will be
implied, 73 they have shown considerable reluctance to name
this implied right.
The first case involving the question seems to have arisen
in an inferior court in Ohio in 1885.74 A landowner had
granted a vein of coal in fee simple without reserving any
right of access to the strata underneath, and the owner of
the coal sought to enjoin the drilling of oil and gas wells
through his coal. The injunction was granted on the
ground that there was no way of necessity. This is the
only case of the sort in which the right has been denied.
In this case, as well as in most of the following cases, there
was, at the time of the severance of ownership, no thought
of any other mineral being subsequently discovered under-
neath the coal.
Six years later the question again arose. On a motion
for a temporary injunction to restrain the drilling of oil and
gas wells through complainant's coal, relief was denied by
the federal court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania"
on the ground that the complainant had failed to show any
immediate danger of injury to his mine. Here, too, there
had been a conveyance of the coal without the reservation
of a right of access. It was urged that gas might leak
from the wells and make mining hazardous. This argu-
ment has been made in every subsequent case, and, while
the courts seemingly had no doubt that the right of access
ought to be allowed, they were troubled as to this threat-
ened danger. However, experience has proved the danger
negligible. 76 It seems that though thousands of wells have
been drilled through coal, there is no case of injury from
such leakage.77 It is quite possible to protect the coal to
insure safety.
13 The doctrine as to easements by necessity would not permit A to go through B's
coal unless there was reasonable cause to believe there might be something of value
underneath to justify such action. Fortunately human nature is such that a man does not
try to explore the depths unless he has some cause to believe there is a reasonable chance
of finding valuable minerals.
74 Jefferson Iron Works v. Gill Bros., 9 Oh. Dec. 481 (1886).
7 Rend v. Venture Oil Go., 48 Fed. 248 (C. C. Pa. 1891). The court here had no
doubt the right of access ought to be allowed.
78 In more recent cases the court provides in its decree that certain precautions
be taken by the one drilling for oil, in order to prevent leakage. But oil and gas
operators do not object to taking precautions, for it is to their advantage to do so, both
on account of the gas they may save and on account of the heavy damages whlcb may
result if leakage occurs.
v In Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286, 25 At]. 597 (1893), the
judge in a concurring opinion referred to some estimates, to the effect that at that
early date some thirty thousand wells had been drilled through coal In this one state,
and not only was there no record of any damage, but no case like this had before
reached the courts, though operations had extended over a period of thirty years.
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The leading case was decided in Pennsylvania in 1893.78
In this case one McKeon, who owned some land, conveyed
all the coal under it to one McCully, who in turn conveyed
it to the Chartiers Block Coal Company in 1881.. Though
there was no reservation of access to the strata beneath the
coal, the owner in 1891 leased the land for oil and gas to
the defendant, who began to drill a number of wells. A
bill to restrain such drilling was denied, the court holding
that there was a way by necessity and that the defendant
was entitled to the benefit of it with due regard to the com-
plainant's rights. The complainant took the case to the
Supreme Court, where it took an extraordinary turn. Chief
Justice Paxton proceeded to discuss the case from a highly
ethical standpoint, pointing out that the social interests of
society made this a question of quasi-public character rath-
er than a contest between two insignificant parties, and then
concluded that there ought to be a right of access of some
sort. He saw an analogy between the right in question and
the surface way of necessity, but felt that the doctrine of a
surface right of way could not be applied to the case at bar.
He thought, however, that it was a "legislative rather than
a judicial question * * * * its wisdom will enable it to dis-
pose of this somewhat difficult question in such manner as
to protect the rights of the surface owner and yet do no
violence to the rights of others to whom he has sold one or
more of the underlying strata * * * * ;,79 but nevertheless
held that the decree of the lower court was not to be dis-
turbed.
The only admirable thing about the decision was that it
permitted the decree to stand. Justice Williams (two other
justices agreeing) filed a concurring opinion, wherein he
held that though there was no way by necessity, there were
reciprocal servitudes of support and of access. That is,
because of their order and arrangement, the various layers
of the earth's crust owe to each other the reciprocal obliga-
tions of access and support. "The lower can only be reached
through the upper. The upper can only be supported by
the lower * * * * they rest on the same foundation."80 And
the judge suggested that servitude of access can be enforced
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just as easily and with the same propriety as the servitude
for support.
All the justices were agreed that the right of access
should be allowed, but were Tfar from clear as to the prin-
ciples upon which it ought to be based. The so-called re-
ciprocal easements of Justice Williams are not only not
reciprocal, but also one of them is not an easement. It can-
not be said that the right of subjacent support is an ease-
ment instead of a natural right.81  Nor can it be established
that the right of access here is a natural right and, not an
easement. One way to test the matter would be to consider
whether either would violate a covenant against incumb-
rances. Clearly the right of access would violate such a cove-
nant, while the right of support, being an incident to the own-
ership, would not. Reciprocal easements are mutual, joint
or cross easements. Where an owner has erected two
houses in such a way that they require support from each
other, or from the soil on which they are respectively erect-
ed, and then the ownership of the two is severed, there
arises what are called reciprocal easements of support.82
Such easements may arise either by implied grant or im-
plied reservation. If the two rights referred to by Justice
Williams are reciprocal, then it would seem both must arise
or neither can arise. If so, then in order to have the right
of subjacent support there must be a reciprocal easement
of access. If B owns a vein of coal to which he has adequate
means of access through adjoining lands, must we allow him
an easement of access regardless of necessity, or deny the
surface owner the right of support by B's estate? If B's coal
does not underlie all of A's land, so that A has adequate access
to the strata beneath, without passing through B's coal, must
we nevertheless allow A the right to pass through B's coal,
or deny B the right of subjacent support? The Pennsylvania
court has quite properly held in other cases that there is
no right of access by implication, where the owner of the
mineral already has adequate means of access through his
SL Professor Gray in his CASES ON PROPERTY, Vol. I, classed natural rights as rights
in the property of another. This was common in the older books. See 2 WASHBURN,
RiAL PROPERTY (3rd ed.) c. 1 §3 (1868). He treats such rights under the heading "Here-
ditaments Purely Incorporeal."
11 Richards v. Rose, 9 Exch. 218 (1853) ; Turnstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1 (1885)
Powers v. Heffernan, aupra, n. 16; Everett v. Edwards, 149 Mass. 588, 22 N. E. 52
(1889) ; Brooks v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639 (1872) ; TIFFANY, Op. cit., n. 21, p. 1294;
R:EVEs, op. cit., n. 71, p. 176.
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own land.83 Plainly the right of subjacent support is a
natural right and has always been allowed without any
connection with the right, of access. Justice Williams evi-
dently used the term "reciprocal easement" as a solving
phrase. Furthermore he does not escape the easement by
necessity, for probably reciprocal easements may properly
be classed as easements by necessity.14
In 1911 a similar case arose once more in Ohio.5 The
owner of oil and gas sought to restrain the surface owner
from interfering with the right to drill for oil and gas.
Complainant derived its title through a coal company,
which had owned the land, but had previously conveyed the
surface to the defendant, without reservation of access to
the oil and gas. The lower court granted the injunction
and this was affirmed without opinion by the supreme court
of Ohio. The lower court probably held there was a way
by necessity, but its opinion shows confusion of ideas, which
is probably largely due to Justice William's language in
the Chartiers Block Coal Company Case.86
In Telford v. Jennings Producing Company,87 the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held that damages should
be allowed for breach of a contract by which the complainant
was to secure for the defendant an oil and gas lease on a
certain tract of land in Illinois, the defense being that the
coal under fifty acres of the land had previously been con-
veyed without reserving a right of access to the oil and gas.
The court held that such right of access would be implied,
and that therefore there was no defect shown in the per-
formance tendered by the complainant to the defendant.
In Kemmerer v. Midland Oil and Drilling Company,"" it was
held that where one had made an agricultural lease for five
years, he might thereafter make an oil and gas lease of the
same land, giving to the oil and gas lessee the right to enter
-' Friedline v. Hroffman. 271 Pa. St. 530, 115 Atl. 845 (1922) ; Titus V. Poland Coal
Co., 263 Pa. St. 24. 106 AtL 90 (1919).
81 It is interesting to note that while the Pennsylvania court was sure the doctrine
as to easements by necessity could not apply to this case. riffany classes these reciprocal
easements as easements by necessity, and probably rightly so. See TrIFANY, op. cit.,
n. 21. pp. 1295-7.
0 Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Oh. C. C. 106 (1911). Affirmed without opinion, 88 Oh. St.
594 (1913).
1, P. 109. This court had been badly confused by reading the opinion in Chartieis
Block Coal Co. Case, supra, n. 77.
203 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 7th Cir. 1913).
229 Fed. 872 (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1915). Suit was started in the state court but
was removed to the Federal Court, where the preliminary injunction granted by the
state court was dissolved. An appeal was taken from this order. This is probably the
first case that arose in which it appeared the parties must have been aware of the
possible existence of the oil and gas at the time of the transaction.
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and drill. In such a case the owner of the land would have
b3 wait only five years for the lease tu terminate, and had
the right of access been claimed by implication to solid
minerals under such circumstances, doubtless it would have
been denied, for there would be no great necessity appar-
ent. But in the case of oil and gas, the necessity does exist
if there are other developments in the vicinity. If the lessor
has to wait five years, his neighbors may get most of his oil
and gas, particularly where the tract is small, as was the
case here. The court in this case followed the Chartiers Block
Coal Company Case. There was a long dissenting opinion by
Justice Sanborn, the arguments of which would apply almost
equally well to any of the cases under discussion here.
In Roma Oil Company v. Long,89 where there was an agricul-
tural lease of school lands followed by an oil and gas lease,
the Oklahoma court followed the Kemmerer Case.
Two Pennsylvania cases have treated the Chartiers Block
Coal Company Case as establishing the law that where no right
of access is reserved to lower strata, on conveyance of a vein
of coal, the right will be implied. One of these arose in the
Superior Court o and on its facts was similar to the Chartiers
Block Coal Company Case.
In the other,91 the plaintiff owned a brewery and in 1888
drove an artesian well to get a water supply. The defend-
ant owned the coal under the land. When the ownership
of the coal was severed does not appear, but it seems that
it was before the well was drilled. The miners of the de-
fendant broke the pipe and thus destroyed the well. The
plaintiff sued in assumpsit for damages, basing his action
on the negligence of the miners. There was verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court, treating the law as settled by the Char-
tiers Block Coal Company Case, held that the plaintiff had a
right to drive the well through the defendant's coal. In addi-
tion to the above autbforities, there are a few other cases which
contain at least dicta in accord.92
With one exception, all of the above cases involve rights
of access to oil and gas where the ownership of the coal has
" 98 Okla. 267, 173 Pac. 957 (1918).
90 Philips G. -& 0. Co. v. Manor Gas Co., 68 Pa. Super Ct. 372 (1917).
91 Pa. Cent. Brwg. Co. v. Lehigh V. Co., 250 Pa. St. 300, 95 At]. 471 (1915).
9, See Donnell v. Otis, 230 S. W. 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ; Gill v. Fletcher. 14 Oh.
St. 295, 78 N. E. 433 (1906) ; Baker v. Pittsburg R. R., 219 Pa. St. 398, 68 Atl. 1014
(1908) ; see also, Pearne v. Coal Creek N. & M. Co., supra, n. 88;
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been severed, or where there has been a lease of the sur-
face of the land. In most of the cases the presence of oil
and gas in the land was not known at the time the owner-
ship of the coal was severed. But such knowledge was
present in the two cases involving leases" of the surface; and
in the artesian well case the presence of percolating waters
was known. Whether or not the necessity is known to the
parties is immaterial.
The view expressed in the Chartiers Coal Case that the
right of access is a natural right, although opposed by the
text writers, finds support in a note in the Harvard Law
Review.93 It is there asserted that the right of access must
be allowed, not because of a grant, real or implied, "but for
the same reasons that riparian rights and rights of support
exist. Like them it is a natural right and must be treated
as always having existed." It is also suggested that "there
can be but one way of necessity-a restriction that would
be curious to apply to oil wells."
There is no authority for the "natural rights" position,
outside of the curious arguments of the judges noted above.
The doctrine as to easements by necessity fits the situation
precisely and it seems undesirable to create a new sort of
natural right, different from all other natural rights, merely
because one disapproves of the basis of our doctrine of
easement by necessity. This would be a strange natural right,
since it would be a right in the land of another, and would vio-
late a covenant against incumbrances in a deed of the ser-
vient tenement. It it submitted that it is better to handle
the situation wherever it arises by applying the principles
of easements by necessity, than to increase the confusion
in the law by the creation of a new right which will defy
classification. The doctrine as to easements by necessity
will furnish a satisfactory solution for all cases that are
likely to arise. Furthermore, it is submitted, the courts
have done very well in working out easements by neces-
sity as they have, and the difficulty is that legislation has not
aided.
The statement that there can be but one way by necessity
is a generalization which has no real basis in the law. Ap-
parently it is based on the fact that in the cases which have
arisen on the surface, only one way happened to be neces-
03 See 7 HAnv. L. R EV. 47 (1893).
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sary. Hence some have concluded there can be but one
such way, notwithstanding such conclusion' is in conflict
with the reasons given for allowing ways by necessity. If
an impassable cliff divided the dominant tenement so that
a way was necessary to each portion, certainly a way would
be allowed to each portion 4 In oil and gas cases a certain
number of wells are necessary to enable the owner to secure
the oil and gas, and so a reasonable number of wells are
permitted,-enough to enable him to have the reasonable
enjoyment of his mineral. The same would be true if a
tract of coal was so large that it could not be mined profit-
ably from one shaft. There is no rule of law to the effect
that there can be but one easement by necessity.
In the above line of cases the right of access is clearly
recognized and enforced, though the cases are not clear as
to the basis of such right. But there is another line of
cases, involving solid minerals, in which no such uncertainty
exists. In these the right of access is held to be an ease-
ment by necessity. Most of these cases involve both the
question as to whether there is an easement by necessity,
and the question as to the extent or scope of the easement.
Usually the two questions are not clearly distinguished. But
in some of them, since there is a right of access expressly
given in more or less general language, only the second
question is involved. For example, suppose A grants land
to B, reserving the coal thereunder with "a right to enter
and remove the same." Suppose this grant is made in
L880, and in 1923 A desires to sink a shaft, build a tipple
connected with the railroad by a switch, erect certain build-
ings necessary to a modern coal mine, and install a number
of ventilators and other safety devices required by statutes,
all of which statutes have been passed since 1880. Has he
the right to do all these things? The question is not wheth-
er there is a right of access, for that is expressly reserved,
but whether A has the right by implication to open and
operate a modern coal mine, with all reasonably essential
appliances. In such cases the surface owner insists that
the language of the reservation must be strictly construed,
and that the right contemplated by the parties is such a
0, In Crotty v. Coal Company. supra, n. 16, there was a road to one part of
the land, yet a way by necessity was allowed to another part. See also Wiese v. Theln.
279 Mo. 524, 214 S. W. 853 (1919).
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right as would have been reasonable as of the time of the
conveyance,-a variation of the doctrine of the Riggs Case.
If such is the extent of the right, then A is deprived of the
enjoyment of the coal just as certainly as if he had reserved
no right, and a way were denied him. But it should be
noted that the question which arises here is the same as
that which arises where the right of access is implied as an
easement by necessity. No distinction can be made between
the two cases insofar as implication of incidents to the rights
of access is concerned. In the cases involving oil and gas,
above, the courts assumed the second question as a rule,
since it is absurd to argue that the oil and gas can be mined
from any considerable area through one well.
The leading case involving an easement to solid minerals is
Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Company.5 Here there had
been a conveyance of land in 1837 with a reservation in the
following language: "Reserving always all mineral ores there-
on now known, or that may hereafter be known, with the priv-
ilege of going to and from all beds of ore96 that may hereafter
be worked on the most convenient route to and from." The
defendant, who owned the minerals, began active mining
in 1864 and the plaintiff brought suit to restrain him and
to recover damages. The case, among other things, in-
volved the right of the defendant to have a dump heap on
the land and to maintain a tramway and steam engine on
the premises. The argument of the plaintiff is curious, but
with some variation the same argument has been urged in
some of the later cases. It is that the general right of access,
which was acquired as an incident to the grant, is here
limited by the spedial privilege, namely, "the privilege of
going to and from all beds of ore * * * * on the most con-
venient route," and that this special privilege being thus
expressly reserved excludes all implications. In other words
the plaintiff argues there would be an easement by necessity
had the deed. been silent on the subject, but since this priv-
ilege was expressly reserved, there can be no other rights
implied. But the court held that a reservation of the miner-
als implies a right to work them, and that this is an ease-
ment by necessity. It held that the express language re-
ferred to merely enlarged the implied right, in that it al-
55 N. Y. 588 (1874).
C, Italics ours.
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lowed the most convenient route to and from the minerals,
while the easement by necessity alone would permit only a
reasonable route. But when the court came to consider the
second question it said :9
"The defendant may not claim, as incident to the grant
to it, that which is convenient. It may have only that
which is necessary, but have that in a convenient way."
It was then held that the defendant had not the right to
pile refuse on the land as he had been doing, because this
was only convenient and not necessary. As to the tram-
way and engine the court concluded that there was suffi-
cient evidence to sustain a finding they were necessary, but
said :18
" * * * * And yet it will also be seen, that the findings
of fact and the request and refusals to find, fail to apply
with strictness to the acts and doings of the parties upon
these premises-the legal test which will exactly and
correctly determine their relative rights and duties. -That
is the test of necessity. As to each of the acts of the de-
fendant complained of, it should have been found as a
matter of fact, whether or not it was necessary to be done
for the reasonably profitable enjoyment'oT its property in
the minerals."
The decree of the court below was accordingly reversed
because that court had not expressly found this necessity
as to each incident in question. Thus the case first holds
that there is an easement by necessity, and then considers
what incidents claimed are to be implied. In an easement
there are certain things which must be implied as incidental
thereto, or the easement cannot fulfill the purposes of its
existence. These are probably what Gale 9 meant by "sec-
ondary easements." But in order to imply an incident to
an easement by necessity, must we apply the same degree
of necessity as when determining whether the easement it-
self will be implied? Or is an easement by necessity like
any other easement in this respect, so that the incidents are
to be determined by considering whether they are reason-
7 P. 553.
"P. 565.
c GALE, EASEMENTS (9th ed.) pp. 437-442 (1916). It may be doubted whether this
term "secondary easements" is a good one. If an easement Is granted in general terms.
there are certain incidents which must be implied. If there Is a way to land for all
purposes then the incidents must be determined by reference to this Scope. If the way
is to coal for the purpose of mining and removing it. then it ought to be tested by
whether the mining is by reasonable methods.
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ably necessary? The latter is the proper test, though the
court above failed to see this. However, it managed to
reach about the same result by saying that these incidents
must be "necessary for the reasonably profitable enjoyment
of its property in the minerals." Whether or not a tramway,
an engine, or a dump heap should be permitted on the prem-
ises are matters which concern the practical business of
mining coal. If the defendant may use modern methods,
then whether a thing is reasonably necessary to the practi-
cal operation of the mine at the present time so that it may
be made a profitable business, is certainly the proper stand-
ard.
In Hooper v. Dora Coal Mining Company,100 the court over-
ruled a demurrer to a bill to enjoin the defendant from dump-
ing refuse on the plaintiff's land, and from taking coal from
underneath adjoining lands through the plaintiff's land.
The court held the bill alleged a good case, since the de-
fendant at least had no right to dump rubbish taken from
other land on to the plaintiff's land. But the court used
the following interesting language :101
c ** * * The bill does not inform us whether the right
of defendant to mine is by reservation in a deed t6 the
surface, or by a grant of the minerals; the grantor reserv-
ing to himself the surface; but this is immaterial-the
relative rights and duties of the parties are the same. It
is well settled, that where one person is the owner of the
surface, and another of the subjacent minerals, the sur-
face is subservient to the mining right as to the occupa-
tion and use of so much as may be reasonably necessary
for the beneficial and profitable working of the mines. A
reservation or grant of the minerals, severed from the
ownership of the surface, carries with it the right to pene-
trate through the surface to the minerals, for the pur-
pose of mining and removing them. This includes the
adoption and use of such machinery, methods, appliances
and instrumentalities as may be reasonably necessary,
and are ordinarily used in such business; and it may be,
for the storage of minerals in the first marketable state
until they can be transported with due diligence."
The above court clearly supported the right of access as
a way by necessity, where not expressly reserved. The
110 95 Ala. 235 (1891).
411 P. 238. As to the incidents, the court plainly holds, there may be those
which are reasonably necessary for the beneficial and profitable working of the mines.
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principle stated as to the extent of the right of access is the
principle which is applied at the present time. The strict
necessity test of the Marvin Case has been discarded. The
above case follows Williams v. Gibson, which is discussed be-
low.
In Baker v. Pittsburgh Railroad,10 2 the land was conveyed re-
serving "all of the coal lying under the same, with all
mining rights and privileges appurtenant thereto." Since
this gave no right of access by express words, the court held
such a right would be implied.
In Himrod v. Fort Pitt Mining & Milling Company,108 it was
held that, under a conveyance which gave a right to the use of
a tunnel for use in mining adjoining claims, the right to pile
refuse on the land would be implied under the circum-
stances. But the court notbd the distinction between im-
plying the easement and implying rights incidental to the
easement.1'
In Porter v. Mack Manufacturing Company,05 it appeared
the land had been conveyed by the grantors, "reserving to
themselves all the clay, fire-clay, coal, stone and minerals
of whatever kind underlying the above tract of land, with the
right to mine and remove the same." The owner of the min-
erals sought to enjoin interference with the construction of
a tramway. The injunction was allowed. The court,
basing its holding on the fact that the right of access was
expressly reserved, seemed of the opinion that the same
result would have been reached had it been implied as an
easement by necessity. This is certainly sound, for it can
make no difference whether the easement is implied or is
expressed in general language.
The next case involved a somewhat different situation.10
There had been a grant of the coal and other minerals,
under the land, "and also all timber and water upon hame,
necessary for the development, working and mining of said
coal and other minerals, and the preparation of the same
for market and the removal of the same; and also the right
of way, and the right to build roads of any description over
102 Supra, n. 92.
105 Supra, n. 41. Further facts will be found in a previous appeal In 202
Fei. 724 (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1918).
I", See supra, n. 41. The term "practical necessities of busineis operations"
expresses the matter well.
1c 65 W. Va. 636, 64 S. E. 853 (1909).
100 Williams v. Gibson, 84 AIa. 228, 4 So. 350 (1887).
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the same, necessary for the convenient transportation of
said coal and other minerals from the land, and the con-
veying and transporting, to and from said land, all minerals
and implements that may be of use in mining and removal
of said coal and other minerals or the preparation of the
same for the market." The owner of the mine had con-
structed on the land five miners' houses; four other log cab-
ins; an air shaft and ventilator; a power-house, a black-
smith shop; and a storehouse where a stock of goods were
kept for the use of the miners. It was contended that,
since the special grant included the timber and water and
the rights of way, under the maxim expressio unius est excw.
sio alterius, no other rights could be implied. This is the
same argument made in the Marvin Case. But the court said
that "one who has the exclusive right to mine coal upon a
tract of land has the right of possession even as against the
owner of the soil, so far as is reasonably necessary to carry
on his mining operations." As to the various buildings, it
said that whether these are reasonably necessary for the
profitable and beneficial working of the mines was a ques-
tion of fact and that even the houses and store might be
reasonably necessary, if the location was one where there
were not such conveniences.
Where there was a reservation of minerals with "the
right of mining and removing at pleasure coal and other
minerals from under the surface of the land; also, the right
and privilege of sinking, if need be, air-shafts for the pur-
pose of working, mining, or removing the same," the court
held the fact there was an express provision for a separate
air-shaft did not indicate an intention to exclude the inci-
dental and implied powers necessary to reasonable enjoy-
ment of the minerals, and that this express liberty is an
enlargement of the powers, not a restriction of them.
107
In Oberly v. Frick Coal Company,08 there had been a grant
of coal "together with the free and uninterrupted right of
way under said land at such points and in such manner as
may be necessary and proper for the purpose of digging,
mining, draining, ventilating and carrying away said coal,
hereby waiving all damages arising therefrom or from the
removal of all of said coal, together with the privilege of
*7 Wardell v. Watson 93 Mo. 107, 5 S. W. 605 (1878).
113 262 Pa. St. 83, 104 AtI. 864 (1918).
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mining and removing through said described premises other
coal belonging to said parties of the second part, * * * * or
which may be hereafter acquired." Part of the coal had
been removed and the supports taken out. A lot of ex-
plosive gas gathered in a place where it could not be re-
moved by the ventilating fans and the defendant entered on
the land over this gas for the purpose of sinking a ten inch
pipe 520 feet to the gas accumulation below. The surface
owner sought an injunction. The injunction was denied on
the ground that the removal of the gas was a necessary inci-
dent to the mining of the coal, in order that such mining
might be carried on safely, and one of the implied rights
incidental to every grant of minerals. If so, then this
right was implied in addition to the broad privileges
of access contained in the grant. There are other cases to
the same effect.10 9
Thus it appears that where there is a right of access by
necessity, or where the right is reserved in general language,
there will be implied as incident thereto whatever is reason-
ably necessary to enable the owner of the minerals to mine
them with advantage according to the methods of the time.
These implications will be made unless express language
negatives them. Even though special language authorize
more acts than would be implied by law such language will
be construed to increase the privileges which the party
would otherwise have by implication. A leading English
text ' 0 is in accord with this, though it cites only Cardigan v.
Armitage,"' which seems to contain only strong dicta. The
soundness of the doctrine cannot be questioned. In the
modern world strong social interests favor the working of
minerals in an economical manner, and such social interests
exert an increasingly strong pressure on the courts.
Most of the above cases involve implied reservations of
the easement by necessity, but the law is settled that im-
plied reservations will be treated like implied grants. Most
of the authorities above so hold, some of them going back
- Other cases which might be cited are Ingle v. Bottoms, 160 Ind. 18, 66 N. E. 160
(1202) ; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Savitz, 57 Ill. App. 659 (1894) ; Strunk v. Morris Run
Coal M. Co., 271 Pa. St. 148, 114 At. 519 (1921).
UP BAMNBRIDGE, MINS (1st Am. ed.) 42 (1871).
1 2 B. & C. 197, 8 D. & R. 414 (1828).
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to an early date." 2 This seems sound, for after an ease-
ment is created, it should be treated like any other ease-
ment of access.
It is evident that the principle that a grant is to be
construed most strongly against the grantor has little or no
application to easements by necessity. The intent of the
parties is immaterial, unless expressed in some way. The
so-called presumed intent is pure fiction; the easement
arises by operation of law, and it arises because the courts
are influenced by the social interests involved.113
That the doctrine is based on social interests seems clear.
Throughout the development of the doctrine, these interests
have played a prominent part. And, today, owing to the
greater concern of the public in the mining and conserva-
tion of our more important minerals, these interests are
operating with increasing strength.
As pointed out above, the basis of doctrine was not given
at first, but soon it was said to be founded on public policy.
During the 19th century, when there was a strong tendency
to refer everything to contract, it was held that the ease-
ment by necessity was the result of the intent of the parties.
Although this was a fiction, it resulted in the doctrine that
the easement can be allowed only where the title to both
tenements can be traced to a severance of ownership by a
common owner. The courts, while speaking of the intent
of the parties, were in fact using a device to extend the
doctrine as far as it equitably could go. Most of the ob-
jection voiced has been based on the belief that the doctrine
was carried farther than was .equitable.
In the mining cases we find the same doctrine being ap-
plied to horizontal estates in land. We find similar social
l 2 lRol. Abr. 60, pL 17; Clarke v. Cogge, Cro. Jac. 170 (1607) ;.Jorden v. At-
wood, Owen 121 (1586).
"An exception is always taken most in favor of the feoffee, lessee, etc., and against
the feoffor, lessor. And yet it is a rule that what will pass by words in a grant, will
be excepted by the same words in an exception. And it is another true rule, that
when anything is excepted, al things that are depending on it, and necessary for the
obtaining of it, are excepted also: as if a lessor except the trees, he may bring his
chapman to view them if he desire to sell them; and he, or the vendee, may cut them
and take them away." SHEPPAID'S ToUcHsToNE, p. 100.
"a The difficulty in applying the doctrine of implied grant or the re-grant, where
the grantee did not execute the conveyance was noted and commented on in Pomfret v.
Ricroft, supra, n. 17, p. 326 6 (s). It is stated that in such a case a way could
only arise as an incident given by law. In this country the conveyance is usually by deed
poll. This raises a technical difficulty which is probably impossible to surinount on
strict common law principles, but our courts have usually disregarded the technical diffi-
culty. This is quite proper since they are engaged in the practical operation of the
legal system. If we look at the matter from the standpoint of the interest of society,
and raise the right because it is in accord therewith, we need have no difficulty as to
whether or not there can be a grant or a re-grant.
36
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1926], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss1/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
interests at play, making if anything, a stronger appeal than
in the surface cases.- No court has hesitated to extend the
doctrine as far as is essential to permit reasonable enjoy-
ment of minerals.
The objection is often made that the reasons of policy on
which the doctrine is based would justify its extension to all
cases of landlocked land; yet the courts have not gone so
far. The reason for this is that the courts have carried the
doctrine as far as they could by means of judicial decision.
Yet, as so applied, there have been very few cases where
the owner of landlocked land has been unable to get an
easement by necessity. Most of the cases of the sort have
arisen on questions of pleading-the real facts have not
appeared." 4 On the whole, it is submitted the courts
have done a good piece of work in developing easements
by necessity as they have without legislative assistance.
u' See cases cited supra, footnotes 59-61. There are only one or two cases in which
th3 court was unable to allow the easement. Most of the cases turn on the pleadings.
I00
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